managerial economics case study forecasting in the global financial crisis 1
Please write two pages case report by answering the three questions at the end of the case.
Make sure to make it as essay not as question and answer.
Forecasting in the Global Financial Crisis
The causes and consequences of the global financial crisis (GFC) are numerous and remain hotly debated. One catalyst was clearly the collapse of the U.S. housing market in 2007â€“2008. The Federal Reserve played a role by overstimulating the economy during 2004â€“2007 when the housing asset bubble was forming. Later the Fed tightened credit conditions throughout late 2007 and early 2008 even though the Bankerâ€™s Roundtable reported that loan demand had â€œfallen off a cliff.â€ Congress played a role in writing legislation that encouraged home ownership by those with no real prospect of repaying a mortgage loan. Subprime mortgage loans were even granted to borrowers with no income, no job, and no assets (so-called NINJA loans). Middle-income borrowers played a role by seeking mortgages for much larger houses than they could afford. Mortgage brokers earned fat commissions facilitating these transactions which bankers approved, while bank regulators looked the other way. ……..
ALL the case attached
- Could stronger corporate governance and greater business integrity have made any difference? The answer to counterfactuals is always uncertain, but brainstorm about how events might have unfolded differently. Suppose more senior executives had refused to sign off on fraudulent conveyance of mis-rated bonds?
- Suppose more monitoring by corporate-level officers had prevented field-agent mortgage brokers from filing mortgage applications that were clearly fraudulent?
- Suppose senior risk managers had asked who would be the counterparties that would need to step forward to buy mortgage-backed securities when it became clear their default rates were grossly underestimated. All markets, especially financial markets, do clear with enough price adjustment. But suppose senior executives in the banks had pressed for straight answers to just how much of a haircut such fraudulently conveyed securities would require. Is it possible at least some of what has transpired could have been avoided?